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Abstract
We model inter-individual di¤erences in preferences for redistribution as a func-
tion of (a) self-interest; (b) stable ideological traits; (c) subjective perceptions of
the relative importance of the main determinants of income di¤erences (luck, e¤ort,
talent). Individuals base the latter on information obtained from their reference
group. We analyse the consequences for redistributive preferences of homophilous
reference group formation based on talent. We argue that our theoretical results
make it possible to understand and integrate some of the main insights from the
empirical literature. We illustrate with GSS data from 1987 how our model may
help in structuring empirical work.
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1 Introduction
Recently, the evidence that citizens have preferences for redistribution that go beyond
their own narrow self-interest has been accumulating (see Alesina and Giuliano, 2011, for
a recent overview). These preferences inuence voting behavior and therefore redistrib-
utive government policies. Feedback mechanisms, with redistributive policies leading to
economic outcomes that in their turn inuence preferences again, may lead to multiple
politico-economic equilibria (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Benabou and Tirole, 2006;
Cervellati et al., 2010; Luttens and Valfort, 2012). In a dynamic setting, di¤erent initial
conditions may, through their e¤ect on preferences and voting outcomes, put economies
on diverging development paths (Alesina et al., 2012).
Although the empirical literature is growing rapidly and becoming slightly disparate,
it is possible to sketch some general ndings. First, self-interest continues to play an
important role: in general, respondents with larger incomes and better education are
less in favour of redistribution. The e¤ects are not always monotonic, however. For
education, it is not uncommon to nd a U-shaped pattern, with both the lowest and
highest education levels in favour of greater redistribution (Georgiadis and Manning,
2012; Pittau et al., 2013). Positive economic prospects and the perception that one has
opportunities to advance in society have a negative e¤ect on the desire to redistribute
(Benabou and Ok, 2001; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005).
Second, values and beliefs about the causes of income di¤erences are of great impor-
tance. People perceive income di¤erences due to luck as illegitimate, and those due to
e¤ort as legitimate. Di¤erent beliefs regarding the relative importance of e¤ort and luck
in explaining actual income di¤erences lead to di¤erent ideas about the desirability of re-
distribution (Corneo and Grüner, 2002; Fong, 2001). Ability falls somewhere in-between
(Isaksson and Lindskog, 2009), as it is partly under the control of individuals (certainly
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if it reects investment in human capital), and partly the outcome of a natural lottery.
Third, there is strong evidence for reference group e¤ects (Keely and Tan, 2008). Sig-
nicant di¤erences have been found between linguistic (Eugster et al., 2011) and ethnic
groups after controlling for other economic and social characteristics. Two mechanisms
are at work here. One is identication: if people conform to the preferences of other
group members, this may lead to the formation of rather stable (sub)cultural di¤erences.
The importance of stable cultural traits is illustrated by the fact that redistributive pref-
erences of immigrants continue to be inuenced by their country of origin (Guiso et al.,
2006; Luttmer and Singhal, 2011). The other mechanism is linked to information: as
individuals are not perfectly informed, they derive information about the actual income
distribution from what they observe in their own reference group (Cruces et al., 2013).
Moreover, consumers in the same social environment are more likely to observe the same
media and hear the same stories about income inequality and its causes.
Fourth, there are direct e¤ects of the neighborhood in which people are living.
Luttmer (2001) found that support for welfare payments is lower for respondents living
in a neighborhood with a larger welfare recipiency rate. In line with the reference group
e¤ect, he also found that support increases as the share of local recipients from the
respondents own racial group rises. In Japan, the level of community interaction in a
region has a positive e¤ect on the willingness of the rich to redistribute, but not of the
poor (Yamamura, 2013).
Fifth, redistributive preferences change over time. Immigrants assimilate to some ex-
tent the values in their country of destination, although assimilation is slow and depends
on the extent of social integration. Changes in the macroeconomic environment (e.g. in
the degree of pre-tax inequality) lead to adaptations in the redistributive preferences of
the population (Olivera, 2012), but the size and direction of the adaptation is mediated
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by a complex mix of intervening variables (Georgiadis and Manning, 2012). Negative
economic shocks in childhood or adolescence may have a lasting e¤ect on redistributive
preferences during adulthood (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011).
Much of the literature has tried to explain the di¤erences between the US and Eu-
rope. Indeed, all of the mentioned e¤ects contribute to the explanation of inter-country
di¤erences. However, at least as striking are the large inter-individual preference di¤er-
ences within countries. It is not easy to integrate the (sometimes conicting) empirical
ndings into a more general explanation of these di¤erences. For obvious reasons, most
authors have focused on specic variables from the above list. Moreover, they have used
di¤erent sets of control variables, dependent on the database that was available to them.
We propose a theoretical model that is able to integrate many ndings from the
empirical literature. As the perception and evaluation of causes of income di¤erences
are essential in understanding di¤erences in preferences, we start from the extension
of the self-interest model that has been proposed in the seminal paper by Alesina and
Angeletos (2005). We follow them in assuming that income di¤erences due to luck are
considered illegitimate and those due to e¤ort legitimate, but we introduce the possibil-
ity that income di¤erences caused by ability may be seen as unjust. The individuals
utility function is a linear combination of a self-interested and a social justice part. Indi-
viduals are characterized by two stable cultural traits: the relative weight given in their
utility function to self-interest versus justice, and the degree of acceptance of income
di¤erences due to ability. Their desired degree of redistribution will then depend on
the importance of luck, e¤ort and ability for the explanation of income di¤erences. We
assume that individuals are not perfectly informed about these variables and that they
derive information about them from what they observe in their reference groups. We
obtain additional insights from a simple model of homophilous reference group formation
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on the basis of ability indicators.
We do not build a complete model of the political equilibrium that would result from
the preferences we analyze. The politico-economic models in the literature are necessar-
ily based on more stylized descriptions of preferences. Our approach going deeper into
the explanation of individual preferences  is complementary to that work. The main
limitation of our model is its static nature. We do not explicitly model mobility, nor do
we analyze learning over time. We focus exclusively on social interactions and on the
inuence of reference groups. Despite these obvious limitations, we are still able to ra-
tionalize many of the ndings in the literature. We suggest a possible channel explaining
why, e.g. education may have a di¤erent e¤ect in di¤erent circumstances. We explain
how changes in beliefs may lead to changes in (reduced) redistributive preferences, de-
spite the fact that individuals have stable cultural traits. We show how changes in the
social structure, i.e. in the social stratication underlying reference group formation,
may induce changes in redistributive preferences.
The next section describes our model of redistributive preferences. In Section 3 we
explore the consequences of homophilous group formation. In Section 4 we reconsider
the existing empirical evidence through the lens of our model. Section 5 presents an
empirical analysis of data from the 1987 round of the General Social Survey (GSS). This
analysis is only meant to be an illustration, as the database is too weak and small to
implement our theoretical model: our only ambition is to sketch a direction in which
future empirical work might go. Section 6 concludes.
2 Preferences for redistribution, cultural traits and beliefs
Assume a unit mass innite population of consumers. Denote the pre-tax income of
individual i by mi. Redistribution is operationalized by a linear income tax scheme,
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with tax rate  2 [0; 1] and a uniform lump sum transfer  m; with m the average
pre-tax income in society. Actual post-tax consumption ci equals post-tax income, i.e.
ci = (1  )mi +  m: (1)
We dene preferences for redistribution in terms of preferences for  .1 These preferences
should be seen as a reduced form, reecting deeper underlying considerations.2 We
therefore build a structural model of preferences, in which we distinguish three sets of
determinants.
The rst set of determinants is related to the self-interest of the individuals, as cap-
tured by their own position within the income distribution. We assume that individual
consumers di¤er in three income determinants: talent (productive capacity), ambition
(taste for e¤ort) and luck.
Second, preferences for redistribution are also motivated by the individuals views re-
garding fairness. We assume that these views are relatively stable cultural or ideological
traits of the individual. A rst trait is the relative weight given to fairness versus self-
interest. A second trait is linked to the content of fairness itself. Ideas about the fairness
of the income distribution reect a position on the relative deservingness of incomes re-
lated to talent, ambition and luck. In line with the empirical literature, we assume that
all fairness-minded citizens consider income di¤erences due to luck as undeserved and
income di¤erences due to taste for e¤ort as ethically acceptable.3 However, empirical
1 In political economy models of the determination of tax rates, each individual voter has a zero impact
on outcome. We focus on individual preferences: the optimal  is then determined as if the individual
is a dictator.
2There is an immediate analogy with the distinction made by Postlewaite (2011) between reduced
formand deeppreferences in the context of social norms.
3Relaxing this assumption is easy within our model, but leads to a large number of empirically
irrelevant cases requiring analysis.
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work (Konow, 2003; Gaertner and Schokkaert, 2012) suggests that there is no consensus
about the deservingness of income di¤erences due to natural talent. We will interpret
di¤erent opinions in this regard as a second stable trait.
Third, individuals with the same fundamental ideas about fairness and the same
self-interest, may still have di¤erent preferences about  , dependent on the character-
istics of the society in which they are living. Since they are not perfectly informed
about the distribution of talent, luck and ambition throughout their society, they have
to form subjective perceptions and beliefs about these population characteristics. We
assume that they form these beliefs on the basis of the information they derive from
their own reference group. We return to the structure of these reference groups in the
next section. For the moment we simply state that for each consumer i 2 I; there is
a set of individuals (i)  I, observations of whom are used to estimate population
characteristics. As an example, average income in society as perceived by individual i is
m(i) =
1
j(i)j
R
j2(i)mjdj. We will use the subscript (i) each time we refer to a variable
that is estimatedby individual i on the basis of observations in her reference group.4
To make these general ideas more specic, assume that the full utility of consumer i
is a convex combination of private utility ui and fairness:
Ui = (1  )ui   
(i); (2)
in which 
(i) stands for the social injustice in society, as perceived by consumer i, and
 2 [0; 1] is a parameter indicating the relative weight of social injustice in overall utility.
As mentioned before,  is assumed to be a stable individual trait.5
4The index i is typically employed for the consumer assessing their preferences for redistribution, and
j concerns typically consumers observed by them.
5To save on notation, we do not use subscripts for these cultural traits, but we will derive comparative
statics results with respect to them.
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Private utility, i.e. the rst component of (2), is specied in a quasi-linear form as
the di¤erence between consumption and the disutility of e¤ort
ui = ci   (ei)
2
2i
;
where ei is a measure of e¤ort and i 2 R+ is the individual taste for e¤ort. Consumption
ci is given by eq. (1) with
mi = iei + "i:
Talent is denoted by i 2 R+ and luck "i 2 R enters the expression in an additive way.
Bringing all this together, anticipated private utility can be written as6
ui = (1  )(iei + "i) + m(i)  
(ei)
2
2i
:
We assume that the consumers know their own personal parameters but estimate average
income m(i) on the basis of observations from their reference group. Luck is dened such
that "(i) = 0.
Consumers maximize their private utility to choose their optimal e¤ort level ei .
Assuming that they neglect the e¤ect of their own e¤ort choice on average income7, this
yields
ei = (1  )ii (3)
such that the resulting consumption level can be written as:
ci = (1  )2 iai + (1  )"i + (1  )a(i)(i); (4)
6Note that we use anticipatedrather than expectedto avoid confusion: individual i knows her own
income determinants i, i and "i when choosing e¤ort and redistribution, such that no expectations
are formed about the own pre-tax income. Yet, the individual has to estimate the distribution of the
di¤erent income determinants in society, and thereby also m; from her own social reference group.
7Since i has zero mass, this immediately follows from j (i)j > 0:
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where we denote for notational simplicity ai  (i)2 ; a(i)  1j(i)j
R
j2(i) (j)
2 dj and
(i)  1j(i)j
R
j2(i) jdj:
Fairness is dened as in Alesina and Angeletos (2005), by taking as a measure of social
injustice the average squared di¤erence between each individuals actual consumption
cj and his deserved (or fair) consumption level c^

j . Di¤erent ideas about what is a
fair consumption level are captured by the superscript . Taking into account that
individuals i have to extrapolate the information they gather from their own reference
group, their perceived unfairness can be written as:8

(i) =
1
j (i)j
Z
j2(i)

cj   c^j
2
dj: (5)
We assume that individuals judge the fairness of the distribution in terms of the
deservingness of the di¤erent income components, and that the deserved (or fair) con-
sumption level of individual j is dened before redistribution, i.e. involves a position on
the acceptability of pre-tax income mj = (1 )ajj+"j . To calculate the fair consump-
tion level, factors for which individuals are not held responsible are put at their mean
value.9 Luck is one of these.10 The e¤ort parameter i is considered to be individual
8The formulation in eq. (5) might suggest that individuals take a parochial attitude and are only
interested in justice within their reference group. This is not our interpretation, however. We could
have started from a more general society-wide measure of injustice. However, as will become clear, only
the means and the variances of the di¤erent variables will enter the expressions for the preferred tax.
Since we assume that these are estimated by the individuals on the basis of their own reference group,
replacing eq. (5) by a more general formulation would not change any of our results. Moreover, in
our theoretical analysis, reference groups can be interpreted very broadly, e.g. they can be seen as a
(probably biased) sample of the overall population.
9This is similar to the conditional egalitarian approach in the theory of responsibility-sensitive egali-
tarianism - see, e.g., Fleurbaey (2008).
10Our setting allows for more extreme positions. At one extreme, we have the laissez-faire or lib-
ertarian conviction that considers all income di¤erences to be justied, such that fairness warrants no
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is own responsibility.11 As mentioned before, individuals di¤er in their ideas about the
deservingness of talent. We therefore write in general that
c^j = (1  )j
 
aj + (1  ) a(i)

: (6)
The cultural trait  indicates the degree to which talent is seen as resulting from deserving
investments by the individual. A value  = 1 represents the meritocratic view, in which
all di¤erences in talent are considered deserved (the case considered in Alesina and
Angeletos, 2005), for  = 0 the distribution of talent is fully undeserved and just follows
from the natural lottery(as would be more consistent with a Rawlsian perspective).
Throughout the analysis, we assume that the conditional means of each of the income
determinants are independent of the value of the other income determinants:
Condition 1 Let E ("j; ) = 0 and E (j"; ) = E () and E (j"; ) = E ().
This assumption may seem unrealistic. It makes sense, however, if one takes into account
that our model is not a model of the real economy, but a model of subjective perceptions.
Moreover, it has an obvious interpretation in the theory of responsibility-sensitive egal-
itarianism. Suppose that individuals are not to be held responsible for luck and talent,
redistribution at all. This can be modelled as c^j = mj for all j: In this case, social injustice 
j equals
the average income change due to taxation and it is minimized by setting  = 0: Note that this fairness
ideal conicts with self-interest for consumers with an income below average. At the other end of the
spectrum, the pure egalitarian position corresponds to c^j = m(i) for all j. We will not analyse this
position as such (it is rarely defended explicitly).
11The philosophical literature on equality of opportunity has made a distinction between two possible
perspectives: one that holds individuals responsible for their preferences (even if these are not freely
chosen), and another that holds them responsible for their chosen e¤ort levels (see, e.g., Fleurbaey, 2008,
for an economic discussion). We use the preference terminology, but as shown by eq. (3), in our model
there is a one-to-relationship between i and e

i (conditional on i and ).
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and that ambition is correlated with talent: can they then be held fully responsible for
ambition? Especially Roemer (1998) has argued that this would be an incoherent view
and that individuals should only be held responsible for that part of ambition that is
not correlated with talent. He then proposes to measure talent and ambition in such a
way that Condition 1 is satised. As a matter of fact, Roemers specic proposal is to
measure the degree of e¤ort as the rank that someone occupies in the income distribution
of all individuals with the same talent. This would mean that the e¤ort distribution is
uniform by assumption. We exploit these ideas about the uniform distribution in the
next section, in which we propose a model of reference group formation.
In this section, we derive the preferences for redistribution, i.e. the optimal value
of  for the situation in which reference groups are given. To gain some intuition, we
start with two simple cases: rst, that of a purely selsh individual; and second, that
of a naiveidealist, who only cares about fairness ( = 1). We nally analyze the full
model of a sophisticated consumer. Most derivations are trivial, and are relegated to
Appendix A.3. The comparative static results are summarized in Table 1.12
2.1 Preferences for redistribution of selsh consumers
The anticipated utility function of the purely self-interested consumer with  = 0 reduces
to:
EUi = (1  )2 iai +  (1  ) a(i)(i)  
(1  )2 aii
2
:
The rst order condition is:
@EUi
@
=
 
1  2SI a(i)(i)    1  SI aii = 0; (7)
12As will become clear, the actual tax rate a has an e¤ect on the preferences of naive individuals who
neglect incentives.
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Table 1: Preferences for redistribution: comparative statics.
self-interest naive fairness incentive sophisticated
self-interest
ai 6 0 0 0 6 0
i 6 0 0 0 6 0
cultural traits
 0 < 0 < (>) 0, < (>) 0;
increasing with  increasing with 
 0 0 0 < (>) 0;
increasing with mi
perceptions
V ar (")(i) 0 > 0 0 > 0
V ar (a)(i) 0 > 0 for  = 0; > 0 > 0 for  = 0;
< 0 for  = 1; < 0 for  = 1;
decreasing with  decreasing with 
(i) > 0 < (>) 0; > 0 > 0 for  = 0;
decreasing with  < 0 for  = 1;
decreasing with 
and 
V ar ()(i) 0 < 0 > 0 < 0
a(i) > 0 < 0 > 0 < (>) 0;
decreasing with 
actual tax rate
a 0 > 0 0 0
12
resulting in the optimal tax rate SI (where the superscript indicates the self-interested
case)
SI =
aii   a(i)(i)
aii   2a(i)(i)
; (8)
for an interior solution.
Individuals with zero pre-tax income (aii = 0) prefer a tax rate 
SI = 0:5. This
brings them at the top of the La¤er-curve, i.e. it is the tax rate maximizing the lump
sum transfer (1   )a(i)(i). When the pre-tax income increases, the corresponding
value of SI decreases. The constraint  > 0 becomes binding at aii = a(i)(i), i.e.
for individuals who perceive themselves to have the average pre-tax income.13 All these
results are well known from the many papers in the tradition of Meltzer and Richard
(1981). Cultural fairness traits obviously have no impact in this model. The (perceived)
means a(i) and (i) have a positive e¤ect on 
SI . If, as can be expected, individuals with
di¤ering talents and tastes for e¤ort have di¤erent reference groups, talent and ambition
will inuence preferences for redistribution through this (indirect) channel. This will be
the topic of the next section.
2.2 Preferences for redistribution of naive idealists
Someone who cares exclusively about fairness will choose  so as to minimize 
(i):
We assume that she neglects incentive e¤ects, i.e. that she observes the actual e¤ort
levels (for the actual observed tax rate a) (1  a)jj and assumes that these remain
xed when the tax rate changes. The same is then true for the fair values c^j =
13The condition for strict concavity of the optimization problem is that aii < 2a(i)(i): We only
consider individuals for which this assumption holds. More about the concavity of the objective function
can be found in Appendix A.2.
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(1  a)j
 
aj + (1  ) a(i)

.14 The anticipated consumption level becomes
cj = (1  ) (1  a)jaj + (1  )"j + (1  a)a(i)(i); (9)
which can be compared to eq. (4). Perceived social injustice can, after some algebraic
manipulations (see Appendix A.1), be written as:

0(i)= (1  )2 V ar (")(i) + (1  a)2 (1     )2

(i)
2
V ar (a)(i)
+2 (1  a)2  a(i)2 V ar ()(i) ; (10)
where we use the superscript 0 to indicate that incentive e¤ects are neglected. The
fairtax rate 0i results from solving the FOC

0(i)
@
= 2  1  0i V ar (")(i)
 2  1     0i  (1  a)2  i2 V ar (a)(i)
+20i (1  a)2
 
a(i)
2
V ar ()(i) = 0; (11)
yielding
0i =
V ar (")(i) + (1  ) (1  a)2

(i)
2
V ar (a)(i)
V ar (m)(i)
(12)
where V ar (m)(i) captures the overall perceived income variation:
V ar (m)(i) = V ar (")(i) + (1  a)2

(i)
2
V ar (a)(i) + (1  a)2
 
a(i)
2
V ar ()(i) :
Eq. (12) reects a trade-o¤ between, on the one hand, undoing unfairness by taxing
away income variation which is due to undeserved income determinants and, on the
other, generating a new kind of unfairness by taxing away deserved income di¤erences.
14An alternative approach would take as the reference a no-tax situation, with e¤ort equal to jj
and fair pre-tax income j
 
aj + (1  ) a(i)

. This would mean, however, that our naive consumer
uses a sophisticated model to go from the observed situation to the counterfactual no-tax world. As a
matter of fact, our comparative statics results remain valid under this assumption (simply set a = 0 in
all expressions).
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The comparative statics can immediately be derived by di¤erentiating eq. (12) and
are summarized in Table 1. The personal income determinants (talent and taste for
e¤ort) do not have a direct inuence on the fair tax rate: because consumer i has by
assumption zero mass in  (i) ; they only matter in the self-interested part of utility.
The fair tax rate of naive observers will increase with the actual tax rate. This is
easy to understand, as a higher observed tax rate a decreases e¤orts, and, thus, the
relative importance of (perceived) deserved versus undeserved income inequality.15 An
increase in  increases the deservingness of talent, thus increasing the deserved fraction
of income variation and therefore decreasing the fair tax rate. As an extreme, in the
pure meritocratic case where  = 1, the fair tax rate simply equals the share of luck in
the overall income variation (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005).
Given , the fair tax rate is determined by perceptions regarding the relative
importance of di¤erent income determinants. If the variance of luck, i.e. the importance
of undeserved income variation in the overall income variation, increases, the ideal tax
rate increases. If the importance of deserved income inequality V ar ()(i) increases, the
ideal tax rate decreases. Since income is multiplicative in talent and e¤ort, the sign of
@0i
@a(i)
is the same as that of @
0
i
@V ar()(i)
:
The e¤ects of changes in the variation of talent are slightly more complex, as they
depend on the value of : Taking the derivative of eq. (12) yields
@0i
@V ar (a)(i)
= (1=(V ar (m)(i))
2 (1  a)2

(i)
2
((1  ) (1  a)2  a(i)2 V ar ()(i)   (V ar (")(i))) 7 0
Naturally, @
0
i
@V ar(a)(i)
> 0 when one considers talent to be fully the result of the natural
15This mechanism is analogous to the one that is described by Alesina and Angeletos (2005) to explain
the di¤erences between the European and the US welfare states.
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lottery ( = 0), since a greater V ar (a)(i) then increases the relative magnitude of un-
deserved income variation. On the other hand, @
0
i
@V ar(a)(i)
< 0 for the meritocratic case,
where talent is entirely a deserved determinant of income inequality ( = 1): The sign
of @
0
i
@V ar(a)(i)
changes at
 =
(1  a)2  a(i)2 V ar ()(i)
(1  a)2  a(i)2 V ar ()(i) + V ar (")(i) :
Hence, @
0
i
@V ar(a)(i)
> 0 ,  2 0;  ; and this area 0;  shrinks if the variance of luck
increases and expands if the variance of taste for e¤ort increases. The e¤ect of i is
similar to that of V ar(a)(i).
2.3 Preferences for redistribution of sophisticated consumers
We now bring together the insights from the two previous subsections and consider
the preferences for redistribution of a sophisticated consumer, who is characterized by
 2 ]0; 1[ and who does take incentive e¤ects into account. This implies that she uses
eq. (6) as her denition of c^j , i.e. that changes in  , leading to changes in pre-tax
income, also imply a change in the deserved consumption level. In fact, since  (and a)
are the same for all individuals, this is only a proportional shift compared to the naive
position.16
Introducing incentives in the fairness component of the utility function yields

(i)= (1  )2 V ar (")(i) + (1  )2 (1     )2

(i)
2
V ar (a)(i)
+2 (1  )2  a(i)2 V ar ()(i) ;
which can be compared to eq. (10). The rst derivative of this expression with respect
16Alesina et al. (2012) mention that it is debatable whether or not (1  ) should enter the denition
of the fairwealth. An alternative is to take as reference the no-tax situation  = 0: As in our model,
this alternative assumption does not change the fundamental results.
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to  is
@
(i)
@
= 2 (1  )V ar (")(i)   2 (1     ) (1  )2

(i)
2
V ar (a)(i)
+2 (1  )2   a(i)2 V ar ()(i)   2 (1  ) 2  a(i)2 V ar ()(i)
 2 (1  ) (1     )2

(i)
2
V ar (a)(i) : (13)
Eq. (13) has to be combined with eq. (7) to nd the overall rst-order condition for the
maximization of the full utility function w.r.t.  ; yielding:
i  (1  )
h
(1  2) a(i)(i)   (1  ) aii
i
  
@
(i)
@
= 0:
We mentioned in the previous subsection that the selsh part of the utility function is
strictly concave only if the pre-tax income of the individual is not too high. As shown
in Appendix A.2, strict concavity of the fairness part is guaranteed if V ar (")(i) is not
too small relative to the contributions of the other income determinants to the overall
pre-tax income inequality. In what follows, we assume that both these conditions are
satised.17
Under strict concavity, the choice problem of consumer i has a unique most preferred
tax rate, denoted i ; which can be found as the solution to the equation i = 0: It is not
straightforward to derive a closed-form expression for i , but the comparative statics
with respect to the di¤erent parameters of the problem can be obtained by the implicit
function theorem. Indeed, for interior solutions, the global strict concavity of the problem
implies:
sgn

@i
@z

= sgn

@ (i = 0)
@z

:
We exploit this fact to analyze the inter-individual variation in the preferences for redis-
tribution.
17Note that the concavity condition proposed by Alesina and Angeletos (2005) is incorrect (see Ap-
pendix A.2).
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The comparative statics results are summarized in Table 1.18 These are essentially
a straightforward combination of the e¤ects from the two previous subsections. There is
one additional twist, however, that follows from the fact that we now have an incentive
component in the fairness part as well. We rst explain this additional e¤ect. Combining
eqs. (11) and (13) yields:
@
(i)
@
=

0(i)
@
ja=   2 (1  ) 2
 
a(i)
2
V ar ()(i)
 2 (1  ) (1     )2

(i)
2
V ar (a)(i) : (14)
The rst three terms on the right hand side of eq. (13) thus represent the original
fairness considerations in the absence of incentive e¤ects, and the last two terms capture
the (new) incentive e¤ects on fairness. These latter terms are both negative. The strict
concavity of 
(i) then implies that sophisticated consumers (taking into account incentive
e¤ects) will have a higher preferred tax rate than naive consumers if we only focus
on fairness. Taking into account incentives lowers the relative importance of deserved
income sources in the overall income inequality, and increases the relative contribution
of luck (which is not a¤ected by incentives). The resulting e¤ects are summarized in the
fourth column of Table 1.
More talented individuals and individuals with a larger taste for e¤ort unambiguously
prefer a lower degree of redistribution because of considerations of self-interest, with
the caveat that we control for di¤erences in their reference groups. For a sophisticated
consumer (contrary to a naive one), the actual tax rate will not inuence her perceptions
of the optimal tax rate, because she fully understands the link between taxes and e¤ort
choices and therefore will discount this inuence in her perception of reality.
We have seen before that consumers with a larger , i.e. those who consider dif-
18The complete mathematical expressions can be found in Appendix A.3.
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ferences in talent to be more deserving, prefer a smaller degree of redistribution when
incentives are neglected. Taking into account incentives introduces an additional e¤ect,
that is increasing in . For su¢ ciently large , taxation reduces the deserved inequality
enough for the incentive e¤ects to come to dominate the direct fairness e¤ect.
The preferred tax rate will increase with the weight given to fairness  for individuals
with
(1  )aii > (1  2)a(i)(i):
This condition obviously holds for all individuals with a higher than average pre-tax
income, who would object to any taxation on purely self-interested grounds. However,
for individuals with a low pre-tax income, who are striving for a large tax rate on self-
interested grounds, increasing the weight of fairness decreases the selsh bias and hence
also the preferred tax rate.
The e¤ect of an increase in the perceived importance of luck is unambiguously posi-
tive. It is identical to the e¤ect for a naive idealistic consumer, since luck does not enter
the self-interested part of the utility function, nor does it inuence incentives.
As seen before, the direct fairness component of an increase in the relative importance
of taste for e¤ort (V ar()(i)) has a negative e¤ect on the preferred tax rate. However,
as we know from eq. (14), the incentive e¤ect works in the opposite direction. It can be
shown, however, that this positive e¤ect will only prevail if i > 0:5, i.e. if the economy
is over the top of the La¤er-curve. We therefore can expect that @

i
@V ar()(i)
will normally
be negative.19 This negative e¤ect also plays for a(i), yet the perceived average talent is
also present in the self-interested component, where (obviously) it will have a positive
e¤ect as long as the economy has not yet reached the top of the La¤er-curve, i.e. when
19 It is instructive to note that the variance of the taste for leisure also has a negative e¤ect on the
optimal tax rate in a full social welfare model with preference variation (Lockwood and Weinzierl, 2012).
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i < 0:5. The overall e¤ect of a change in a(i) will therefore depend on the value of .
The lower the weight given to fairness, the larger the probability that an individual that
perceives a larger value of a(i) will indeed prefer a larger tax rate.
The e¤ect of V ar (a)(i) is more complicated than that of V ar()(i), because it depends
on the value of . Obviously, if  = 0, i.e. when talent is seen as merely the result of
the natural lottery, an increase in its variance will increase the optimal tax rate. In
the situation without incentives, @

i
@V ar(a)(i)
was unambiguously decreasing for increasing
 and became negative for a large enough . We see the same tendency here. The
incentive component extends the range for which @

i
@V ar(a)(i)
> 0, but does not change the
basic pattern (for i 6 0:5). In the extreme meritocratic case, with  = 1, income due
to talent is as much deserved as income due to e¤ort: from the fairness point of view,
changes in V ar (a)(i) and in V ar()(i) are equivalent.
The relationship between (i) and V ar (a)(i) is the same as that between a(i) and
V ar()(i). Again, the self-interest e¤ect will strengthen the positive e¤ect of an increase
in (i) on 

i as long as 

i < 0:5: The overall e¤ect will therefore also depend on the
value of .
3 Social interactions and formation of beliefs
The model of the previous section establishes a link between redistributive preferences
and the perceived variances and means V ar (")(i) ; V ar (a)(i), V ar()(i), (i) and a(i):
This relationship may lead to inter-country di¤erences in reduced preferences even if
there are no ideological di¤erences and if individuals are perfectly informed. However,
it is more realistic to assume that individuals are not perfectly informed. Boundedly
rational (naive) consumers may then derive the needed information from what they
observe in their own reference group and act as if this reference group were representative
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of the entire population (Cruces et al., 2013). Even sophisticated consumers, who realize
that the information derived from their neighborhood is biased, will nd it hard to correct
for such bias with more information.20
In traditional societies, networks remain rather stable over time. In modern societies,
stable factors such as ethnicity admittedly still play an important role. Yet, when social
mobility increases, individuals get the opportunity to choose to a larger extent their
own reference groups. Modelling this process of network formation yields additional
insights in the causes of di¤erences in redistributive preferences. It is well documented
that social networks tend to be homophilous: like tend to meet like much more than
proportionally (see e.g. McPherson et al. (2001) for a survey). To model this in the
simplest way, we assume that reference groups are formed on the basis of two relevant
characteristics: natural talent ai and an income-irrelevant quality qi (examples being
religion, skin color, geographical location or lifestyle). The former is related to education
and is a natural candidate as a factor of social stratication.21 Talent and the income
irrelevant quality are distributed according to a joint distribution function  (a; q) ; with
marginal distributions a (a) and q (q) : The joint and marginal density functions are
denoted respectively  (a; q) ; a (a) and q (q) :
Assume that maintaining a social relation comes at a constant disutility cost c > 0;
and that the benets B (i; j) for consumer i from a relationship with consumer j are
20Consumers may use other information sources, such as what they see and hear in mass media. Of
course, this information is also biased. The (interesting) question of how consumers may combine biased
information from di¤erent sources is not analysed in this paper.
21Ambition and taste for e¤ort are more di¢ cult to observe and therefore less likely to be the driving
force behind network formation. However, one can easily study homophily in ambition or luck by
replacing ai or qi by i or "i:
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decreasing with the distance between them:
B (i; j) =

 jai   aj j+ (1  ) jqi   qj j ;
with  a parameter indicating the constant marginal utility of 1jai aj j+(1 )jqi qj j and  2
[0; 1] indicating the relative importance of talent in the formation of social relationships.
Establishing a relationship is worthwhile if
 jai   aj j+ (1  ) jqi   qj j 6  (15)
with   (=c): This parameter  can be seen as a measure of network size.
The e¤ects of changes in ai;  and  on network formation depend in an intricate way
on the form of the distribution  (a; q). Here we will focus on the case where talent and
the quality q are independently and uniformly distributed, since this allows us to derive
clear-cut conclusions.22 As argued before, the uniformity assumption is less unrealistic
than may seem at rst sight, at least in a model of perceptions and subjective beliefs.
One natural interpretation is that a and q are measured as the rank individuals occupy
in the ordering of respectively talent and the income irrelevant-quality.
It follows directly from eq. (15) that
 (i) = fjj jai   aj j+ (1  ) jqi   qj j 6 g : (16)
In traditional societies with low social and geographical mobility, , i.e. the relative
importance of the productive quality, is most likely low. If  increases, then the range
of productivities observed in the social network  (i) decreases. In the Cartesian (a; q)
plane, if  2 ]0; 1[, then  (i) is a rhombus with edges
ai   

; qi

;

ai; qi +

(1  )

;

ai +


; qi

;

ai; qi   
(1  )

:
22A discussion of reference group formation for generic distribution functions in the case where only
natural talent matters is presented in Appendix A.4.
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Figure 1: Network structure in two-dimensional case
If  = 1; we are back in the one-dimensional situation with  (i) = fjjaj 2 [ai   ; ai + ]g,
i.e. a vertical band of width 2 around ai; on which the perceived distribution co-
incides with a: For  = 0; the social network is a horizontal band around qi; i.e.
 (i) = fjjqj 2 [qi   ; qi + ]g : In this case we get that 8i; j 2 I : V ar (a)(i) = V ar (a)(j)
and a(i) = a(j) if a and q are independently distributed.
The most interesting question is what happens if  2 ]0; 1[ increases, i.e. if the
productive dimension a becomes more salient for social network formation. Note that
the four points f(ai  ; qi  )g are always on the frontier. Indeed, the edges of the
rhombus pivot around these four points (see Figure 1). The e¤ect of changes in  on
the perceived average a(i) or the perceived variance V ar (a)(i) depend in a complex way
upon the shape of the distribution function  (a; q).
Consider now the special case in which a (a) and q (q) are independent and uni-
form, with compact support on a rectangle [L; R][D; U ]. Then j (i)j = 2L1L2

2
(1 )

;
with L1 = R L and L2 = U D. The perceived density function becomes a symmet-
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ric triangular density function around mean ai, i.e.
 (ajqi;)
j(i)j = (=)
2 ((=) ja  aij) for
a 2 [ai   (=); ai + (=)] and 0 elsewhere.23 With this density function, it is obvious
that
@a(i)
@ai
= 1 and
@a(i)
@ =
@a(i)
@ = 0: More interestingly, we can derive that
V ar(a)(i) =
1
6
(


)2:
Hence, as long as  (i) supp( ()), we have that @V ar(a)(i)@ < 0;
@V ar(a)(i)
@ > 0, and
@V ar(a)(i)
@ai
= 0: Increasing the weight  given to talent in network formation or decreasing
the size of the network  decreases the perceived variance of talent. We summarize these
results in Table 2.
Table 2: E¤ects of endogenous network formation with uniform distributions
V ar(a)(i) a(i)
ai 0 1
 (network size) > 0 0
 (weight given to talent) < 0 0
4 Applications: Redistributive preferences and social structure
We will now show how the empirical ndings summarized in the introduction can be
tted into our model. This is, of course, not a formal testof the theory, but just an
illustration of the kind of empirically meaningful hypotheses that can be derived, and
that may help to explain some of the empirical puzzles.
Our model is built on the assumption that reference groups are essential in the
formation of redistributive preferences, and it is therefore immediately applicable to
explain di¤erent attitudes between, e.g., linguistic, ethnic or religious groups. The most
23For simplicity, we restrict our attention to cases where the support of  (i) is in the interior of the
support [L; R] [D; U ] :
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popular explanation of these di¤erences is in terms of underlying ideological preferences.
We suggest that informational aspects should not be neglected. Di¤erent beliefs will
induce di¤erences in redistributive preferences, even when individuals have the same
underlying cultural traits. This channel, linking redistributive preferences to features of
the economic environment, o¤ers a broadened perspective on ethnic di¤erences. Surely,
ethnicity has an important e¤ect on network formation. If black citizens perceive that
luck is more important in the explanation of income di¤erences and that e¤ort is not
rewarded, they will be more in favour of redistribution than white citizens who believe
that e¤ort and ability are the dominant factors in explaining income di¤erences.
The informational approach is especially relevant when there is no clear a priori
explanation for the occurrence of ideological di¤erences. Commonly-found regional dif-
ferences within a country o¤er a straightforward application. It is more natural to
assume that di¤erent regions are characterized by di¤erent socioeconomic environments
than that they have di¤erent ideologies. At least, it is an interesting empirical exercise
to attempt explaining inter-regional di¤erences as much as possible with socioeconomic
variables and to treat ideologyas a residual category. As a specic example, the in-
formation channel may contribute to explaining the ndings of Luttmer (2001) that the
support for welfare payments is lower among respondents living in a neighborhood with
a larger welfare recipiency rate. In such a neighborhood, the perceived average income
is likely to be smaller, such that selsh voters in such a neighborhood are less supportive
for redistribution because they underestimate its material gains for them. Moreover, the
e¤ect of ability di¤erences will be perceived to be smaller. This would also lead to a
decrease in redistributive preferences for individuals that consider such di¤erences to be
undeserved.
Researchers who have looked into the e¤ect of the increase in inequality on redistrib-
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utive preferences over time have found mixed results (Olivera (2012) gives an overview).
Our model suggests that this can be due to the fact that changes in inequality, i.e. in
V ar(m)(i), as such are irrelevant. What matters are changes in the relative contribu-
tions of the di¤erent factors (talent, e¤ort and luck). If people think that the increase
in inequality is due to the increased importance of luck (e.g. if it follows from interna-
tional competition), they will be more in favour of redistribution. If, however, they think
that it reects a larger spread of ability di¤erences (e.g. due to a larger dispersion of
skills), the e¤ect on redistributive preferences will depend on underlying cultural values
and on the perceived causes for a greater dispersion of skills (e.g. larger di¤erences in
starting position or a more pronounced amplication of such initial di¤erences through
education).
More interesting insights follow when we take into account the process of endogenous
group formation, i.e. merge the results from Tables 1 and ??. Consider the e¤ect of
a variable such as education. In a simple self-interest model, education should have
a negative e¤ect on the willingness-to-redistribute, if one controls for reference group
e¤ects  see Table 1. However, in a world with homophilous group formation, higher
educated people may have a larger perceived a(i) than lower educated people - and it is
even likely that they overestimate the average productivity in society. This theoretical
prediction is corroborated in the empirical results of Cruces et al. (2013). The positive
e¤ect of ai on a(i) will generate a more positive attitude towards redistribution among
higher educated self-interested citizens. The interplay between the di¤erent factors may
then generate the non-monotonic relationship that has been found in empirical work.
Second, while the existence of stable cultural traits explains why migrants keep -
to a large extent - the redistributive preferences prevailing in their native country, the
gradual assimilation to the values in the country of destination may reect a shift in
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their perceptions about the relative importance of talent, e¤ort and luck. The longer
the immigrants live in their new country, the less important their origin will become for
network formation and the more representative their network will be for the relevant
distributions in the country of destination. If, in addition, gradual assimilation implies
that they form more homophilous networks in terms of talent (in our model this is
represented by an increase in ), this will decrease their perception of the variance of
talent. The e¤ect on their (reduced form) redistributive preferences will then depend
on the value of . Immigrants in the US will often come from countries that are less
meritocratic (i.e. have a lower value of ). A reduction in the perceived variance because
of the integration in more homophilous networks will then lead to a decrease in the
desired redistribution over time, even when their ideological background does not change.
Third, an increase in regional social capital (measured by participation in community
activities, as in Yamamura, 2013) can be interpreted as a decrease in  (the importance
given to ability) and an increase in network size . Both e¤ects lead to an increase in
the perceived variance of talent and, hence, to an increase in redistributive preferences
for the less meritocratic individuals. While it is not in our model, it is likely that an
increase in  will also lead to an increase in the perceived variance of luck. If this e¤ect is
stronger for the rich (again a reasonable assumption), it may explain why the increase in
redistributive preferences resulting from social integration is stronger amongst the rich
than amongst the poor (as observed by Yamamura). Yamamura (2013) argues that his
results point to the existence of psychological externalities, but the information channel
in our model o¤ers an alternative explanation.
Fourth, long run changes in the social structure of societies can also be interpreted in
terms of changes in the network formation parameters  and : Sociologists have docu-
mented the downfall of the great ideologies and the rise of secularization. Moreover, the
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revolutionary improvement of transport and communication infrastructure has reduced
the salience of the location of consumers. Both mechanisms have diminished the impor-
tance of non-productive individual characteristics (such as religion or location) for the
formation of networks and have increased the potential to form networks that are more
homophilous in talent a. In our model, this is translated as an increase in , implying
in its turn a smaller perceived variation in productive talents. Our results then pre-
dict a decrease in the preferences for redistribution within the less meritocratic (more
Rawlsian) societies. This is exactly what has been observed during recent decades
within Western Europe. Our model also predicts that these developments will lead (ce-
teris paribus) to a more positive attitude towards redistribution in more meritocratic
societies.
5 Empirical illustration
Many of the papers in the empirical literature use clever research designs, but the derived
insights often remain partial or are not fully integrated within an overall coherent frame-
work. In this section we o¤er a sketch of how a more structural approach could look.
Application of our model requires the nding of empirical counterparts for its theoretical
parameters (talent, taste for e¤ort, cultural traits, perceived variances, etc.) and then to
exploit the structure that is suggested by the theory. We are unaware of any dataset that
is su¢ ciently rich to implement our full model. As a rst approach, we will make use
of one round of the General Social Survey (GSS). Obviously with cross-sectional data it
is nearly impossible to identify any causal relationships. We will therefore only be able
to show some suggestive associations. This empirical analysis is only an illustration and
denitely not a testof the theory.
The General Social Survey was set up by the National Opinion Research Center at
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the University of Chicago in 1972, and collected its 29th round in 2012. We use the 1987
round, as it contains two topical modules which cover part of our data needs: the GSS
topical module on Sociopolitical Participationand the 1987 International Social Survey
Program (ISSP) module on Social Inequality. The former module provides detailed
data about group membership and social interactions. The latter does not only contain
a broad variety of indicators of the support for redistribution, but also questions on the
respondentsbeliefs about the relative importance of various determinants of income.
The 1987 round of the GSS contains data for 1819 randomly chosen respondents.24
We measure preferences for redistribution () as the rst principal component ob-
tained from four variables25: redist1, based on responses to the statement Some people
think that the government in Washington ought to reduce the income di¤erences between
the rich and the poor, perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy families or by giving in-
come assistance to the poor. Others think that the government should not concern itself
with reducing this income di¤erence between the rich and the poor(0-6 scale); redist2,
which collects responses to the question It is the responsibility of the government to
reduce the di¤erences in income between people with high incomes and those with low in-
comes(responses ranging from 0 (disagree strongly) to 4 (agree strongly)); incdi¤ with
responses to the statement "Di¤erences in income in America are too large" (ranging
from 0 (disagree strongly) to 4 (agree strongly)); and txshrri Do you think that people
with high incomes should pay a larger share of their income in taxes than those with low
incomes, the same share, or a smaller share..., with responses ranging from 0 (much
lower share) to 4 (much higher share). The summary statistics of these four variables
are provided in Table 3. Factor analysis yields a unique factor FactRedis, for which the
24The exact denitions of all variables are provided in Appendix B.
25We renormalized all variables such that a higher value stands for a more positive attitude towards
redistribution.
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factor loadings and specic variances after a traditional varimax rotation are also shown
in Table 3. We take the factor scores for FactRedis, obtained through regression scoring,
as our preferred measure of preferences for redistribution, as we believe that this is the
best way to exploit the richness of the data and to lter out idiosyncratic noise. The
previous literature has often made use of redist1 (see, e.g., Alesina and Giuliano, 2011).
For comparison purposes, the results with that variable are shown in Appendix C. They
are very similar to the results obtained with FactRedis.
Table 3: Dependent variables and factor loadings
Summary statistics Redistribution Factor: FactRedis
variable mean sd p50 min max N Rotated factor loading Uniqueness
redist1 3.4 2 3 0 6 1786 0.7417 0.4498
redist2 1.9 1.2 2 0 4 1484 0.8010 0.3584
txshrri 2.9 .8 3 0 4 1454 0.5572 0.6895
incdi¤ 2.5 1 3 0 4 1490 0.7411 0.4507
Ideological parameters and perceptions of the relative importance of the various
income determinants play a crucial role in our explanatory framework. The GSS 1987
contains many variables that are relevant in this context. The summary statistics of these
beliefs and perceptions are displayed in Table 4. A rst series characterizes respondents
beliefs about the importance of 13 determinants of success in life, ranging from 0 (not
important at all) to 4 (essential): coming from a wealthy family (belwealf ), having
well educated parents (beledupa), having a good education (beledu), ambition (belambit),
natural abilities (belabil), hard work (belwork), having the right connections (belcnnct),
having good political connections (belpolcn), race (belrace), having the right religion
(belrelig), coming from the right region (belregio), gender (belsex ) and having the right
political views (belpolvi). A second series of variables captures respondentsperceptions
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Table 4: Summary statistics of perceptions and beliefs
variable mean sd p50 min max N
belwealf 1.6 1.1 2 0 4 1514
beledupa 2.2 .95 2 0 4 1533
beledu 3.2 .72 3 0 4 1542
belambit 3.3 .7 3 0 4 1530
belabil 2.7 .76 3 0 4 1529
belwork 3.2 .69 3 0 4 1547
belcnnct 2.4 .86 2 0 4 1539
belpolcn 1.6 1 2 0 4 1485
belrace 1.4 1.1 1 0 4 1498
belrelig 1.2 1.2 1 0 4 1508
belregio .98 .99 1 0 4 1510
belsex 1.3 1.1 1 0 4 1494
belpolvi 1.2 1 1 0 4 1486
incmoti 1.9 .81 2 0 3 1459
incresp 2.7 1 3 0 4 1519
incskil 2.4 1.1 3 0 4 1506
incedu 2.8 1.1 3 0 4 1519
incprosp 2 1 2 0 4 1458
belbuspr 2.3 1.1 2 0 4 1477
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of the incentive e¤ects of income inequality. The variable incmoti indicates whether
respondents think that large di¤erences in pay are necessary to induce people to work
hard, with answers ranging from 0 (denitely not necessary) to 3 (absolutely necessary).
The variable incresp asks whether people believe that di¤erences in pay are necessary
for people to take responsibility. The answers to this and the next 4 questions range
from 0 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). Incskil asks whether pay di¤erences are
necessary for people to acquire extra skills and qualications. Incedu asks whether pay
di¤erences are necessary for people to study. Incprosp asks whether respondents deem
large income di¤erences necessary for Americas prosperity. Incbuspr asks whether good
business prots enhance everyones standard of living. Finally, the variable polviews
captures the respondents self-rated position on the political spectrum, from 1 (extremely
liberal) to 7 (extremely conservative).
We again use factor analysis to structure this information. The variables belabil and
polviews are kept out of this factor analysis, as their unique variance is too high (respec-
tively more than 66% and 74% of their variance). For the other 18 variables, we retain
ve factors with an eigenvalue greater than 1 on the basis of a principal-component
factor analysis. The factor scores obtained by regression scoring are used in the further
analysis. The factor loadings, again after varimax rotation, are depicted in Table 5.
With due caution, we can link these variables to our theoretical concepts. We interpret
polviews as a cultural trait (related to ). Moreover, the interpretation of belabil and
factorE¤ as approximations of V ar(a)(i) and V ar()(i) is natural. If one is willing to
interpret as luckall income determinants that are neither e¤ort nor ability, then one
could venture to interpret the perceived importance of discrimination (FactorDi) and of
social capital by parentage (FactorPa) as related to V ar(")(i). The perception of incen-
tive e¤ects, both the particular ones in FactorPIn (e¤ect of pay di¤erences on particular
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Table 5: Beliefs: rotated factor loadings and uniqueness
Variable FactorDi FactorPa FactorPIn FactorE¤ FactorGIn Uniqueness
belwealf 0.2054 0.7249 0.0176 -0.0940 -0.0039 0.4232
beledupa 0.0307 0.7228 0.0383 0.1074 0.0980 0.4541
beledu -0.0839 0.4067 0.0094 0.6008 -0.0656 0.4623
belambit -0.0541 0.0596 -0.0206 0.7409 0.0092 0.4441
belwork 0.0314 -0.1552 0.1144 0.7703 0.0561 0.3653
belcnnct 0.2973 0.6371 0.1219 0.0588 0.0264 0.4867
belpolcn 0.4326 0.5884 0.0849 -0.0386 0.0413 0.4563
belrace 0.6554 0.2736 0.0760 -0.0603 -0.0932 0.4775
belrelig 0.7554 -0.0173 0.0185 -0.0113 0.0849 0.4214
belregio 0.7684 0.1064 0.1028 0.0046 0.0423 0.3859
belsex 0.6513 0.2118 0.0022 -0.0340 0.0297 0.5289
belpolvi 0.7357 0.1827 0.0125 -0.0120 0.1188 0.4109
incmoti 0.1312 0.0869 0.1959 0.1026 0.4984 0.6780
incresp 0.0517 0.0567 0.8001 0.0801 0.0849 0.3403
incskil 0.0466 0.0042 0.8031 0.0191 0.0578 0.3491
incedu 0.0553 0.1205 0.6502 -0.0130 0.1602 0.5339
incprosp 0.0784 0.0386 0.1773 -0.0100 0.7814 0.3502
belbuspr 0.0216 0.0196 0.0119 0.0180 0.7523 0.4327
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e¤ort decisions) and the general ones in FactorGIn (e¤ect of pay di¤erences on general
prosperity) do not appear as such in our theoretical model, because we did not allow for
inter-individual di¤erences in beliefs about incentives. However, it seems important to
control for them in our regressions.
Table 6: Descriptive statistics independent variables
variable mean sd p50 min max N
rlincome 28 23 21 .5 90 1665
prospect 2.8 .92 3 0 4 1509
educ 12 3.3 12 0 20 1809
female .57 .49 1 0 1 1819
black .3 .46 0 0 1 1819
raceoth .029 .17 0 0 1 1819
age 45 18 41 18 89 1807
occmobi 1.1 .74 1 0 2 1367
granborn .92 1.5 0 0 4 1693
memnum 1.6 1.9 1 0 16 1808
attend 4.1 2.5 4 0 8 1806
racehome .34 .47 0 0 1 1819
comsize 4.7 14 .23 0 71 1819
comedu 58 177 3.1 0 1414 1809
Finally, we include a number of socioeconomic control variables. Summary statistics
are provided in Table 6. Rlincome is the household income, prospect the expectation of
future standard of living, educ the respondentsyears of education, age is the respon-
dentsage, female, black and raceoth are dummies indicating respondentsgender and
race (the latter indicates non-white and non-black), granborn the number of the respon-
dentsgrandparents born outside of the U.S.A. and comsize is the number of inhabitants
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in the respondents commune. Occmobi measures how di¤erent the status of the present
profession of the respondent is from her fathers profession when the respondent was 16
(answers range from 0 about the same to 2 much higher or much lower)26, at-
tend indicates church attendance with answers ranging from 0 (never) to 7 (every week).
Racehome is a dummy variable which indicates that the respondent has had somebody
of another race for dinner at her house in the recent years. Memnum indicates the re-
spondents number of memberships of organizations and clubs. Comedu, nally, is an
interaction term between education and community size.
Table 7 presents a set of regressions explaining preferences for redistribution. Tables
8 and 9 report the results of 7 OLS regressions, explaining individual beliefs and percep-
tions as a function of the extended set of control variables. For the overall interpretation
of our results, these di¤erent tables have, of course, to be combined. Let us rst look
at Table 7. The rst column shows the result of the simplest regression possible, in
which we introduce the most essential demographic and economic variables. The second
column extends the set of explanatory variables. None of the results are surprising.
Self-interest plays a role as expected: income and the prospect of being better o¤ in the
future decrease support for redistribution. It is worth noting that being female has no
signicant e¤ect, but that blacks have a much stronger preference for redistribution.27
In line with earlier work on the persistence of preferences for redistribution among the
o¤spring of recent migrants, we observe, on average, more support for redistribution if
more of the respondents grandparents were born outside the U.S.
26We focus on absolute di¤erences to capture the feature of our model that what matters most are
the variances of the observations.
27While the e¤ect of education is negative, it is barely signicant. As shown in the Appendix, its
e¤ect in these simple regressions is stronger with the alternative (simpler) denition of redistributive
preferences.
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Table 7: Explaining preferences for redistribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FactRedis FactRedis FactRedis FactRedis
rlincome -0.00527*** (0.00134) -0.00535*** (0.00138) -0.00433*** (0.00138) -0.00438*** (0.00138)
prospect -0.170*** (0.0312) -0.177*** (0.0330) -0.116*** (0.0346) -0.122*** (0.0345)
educ -0.0136 (0.0105) -0.0221* (0.0119) -0.0299** (0.0133) 0.0395 (0.0413)
female 0.0531 (0.0565) 0.0384 (0.0598) 0.0950 (0.0624) 0.684*** (0.220)
black 0.391*** (0.0674) 0.388*** (0.0794) 0.326*** (0.0857) 0.228 (0.286)
raceoth 0.289* (0.173) 0.0465 (0.190) -0.147 (0.219) -0.198 (0.218)
age 0.00282 (0.00179) 0.000909 (0.00199) 0.00143 (0.00211) 0.00143 (0.00210)
occmobi 0.0916** (0.0394) 0.0871** (0.0412) 0.0852** (0.0410)
granborn 0.0720*** (0.0205) 0.0566*** (0.0215) 0.0577*** (0.0214)
memnum -0.0147 (0.0164) -0.0277* (0.0165) -0.0264 (0.0164)
attend -0.00286 (0.0123) 0.00759 (0.0129) 0.00620 (0.0129)
racehome 0.0292 (0.0660) 0.0103 (0.0675) -0.00204 (0.0674)
comsize -0.0162* (0.00905) -0.0157* (0.00902) -0.0169* (0.00904)
comedu 0.00155** (0.000684) 0.00145** (0.000670) 0.00154** (0.000670)
FactorDi 0.0596* (0.0331) 0.0548* (0.0331)
FactorPa 0.0908*** (0.0321) 0.0815** (0.0321)
FactorPIn 0.126*** (0.0309) 0.123*** (0.0307)
FactorE¤ -0.0731** (0.0314) -0.0746** (0.0314)
FactorGIn -0.161*** (0.0314) -0.159*** (0.0313)
belabil 0.0855** (0.0432) 0.520*** (0.201)
polviews -0.102*** (0.0234) -0.102*** (0.0233)
abil_edu -0.0243* (0.0143)
abil_fem -0.219*** (0.0797)
abil_bla 0.0417 (0.0984)
_cons 0.517*** (0.197) 0.581*** (0.213) 0.628** (0.283) -0.578 (0.606)
N 1150 1039 859 859
R2 0.103 0.121 0.238 0.248
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01 36
Table 8: Explaining Beliefs and Perceptions (Part 1)
(1) (2) (3)
FactorDi FactorPa FactorPIn
rlincome -0.00362 (0.00144) -0.00376 (0.00145) -0.000888 (0.00146)
prospect 0.000473 (0.0351) -0.0550 (0.0354) -0.0251 (0.0357)
educ -0.00421 (0.0132) 0.0122 (0.0133) -0.0662 (0.0134)
female -0.0597 (0.0640) -0.225 (0.0645) -0.00409 (0.0651)
black 0.308 (0.0874) 0.359 (0.0881) 0.0610 (0.0889)
raceoth -0.0230 (0.216) 0.0708 (0.218) -0.0139 (0.220)
age 0.0104 (0.00215) -0.000165 (0.00217) -0.000102 (0.00219)
occmobi -0.000689 (0.0429) 0.0118 (0.0433) 0.0870 (0.0437)
granborn -0.0171 (0.0221) 0.0306 (0.0223) 0.00151 (0.0225)
memnum 0.00336 (0.0175) 0.0200 (0.0177) -0.0288 (0.0178)
attend 0.0235 (0.0132) -0.0498 (0.0133) -0.00532 (0.0134)
racehome -0.133 (0.0710) 0.0564 (0.0716) -0.0750 (0.0723)
comsize -0.00797 (0.00948) 0.0220 (0.00956) -0.00406 (0.00965)
comedu 0.000777 (0.000700) -0.00124 (0.000706) 0.0000577 (0.000712)
_cons -0.397 (0.232) 0.220 (0.234) 0.959 (0.236)
N 951 951 951
R2 0.073 0.082 0.063
Standard errors in parentheses
p < 0:10, p < 0:05, p < 0:01
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Table 9: Explaining Beliefs and Perceptions (Part 2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FactorE¤ FactorGIn belabil polviews
rlincome -0.00105 (0.00145) 0.00200 (0.00144) -0.00149 (0.00104) -0.000107 (0.00187)
prospect 0.226*** (0.0354) 0.178*** (0.0352) -0.00249 (0.0246) 0.0502 (0.0439)
educ 0.0185 (0.0133) -0.0718*** (0.0132) -0.0292*** (0.00897) -0.0106 (0.0165)
female 0.209*** (0.0646) -0.0721 (0.0642) -0.0447 (0.0452) -0.138* (0.0810)
black -0.158* (0.0882) -0.00675 (0.0876) 0.219*** (0.0595) -0.418*** (0.108)
raceoth -0.0723 (0.219) 0.0564 (0.217) 0.259* (0.137) 0.0494 (0.259)
age -0.00386* (0.00217) 0.00365* (0.00215) 0.00308** (0.00149) 0.00205 (0.00270)
occmobi 0.0819* (0.0433) 0.178*** (0.0430) 0.0326 (0.0296) -0.0729 (0.0532)
granborn -0.0208 (0.0223) 0.00646 (0.0222) 0.0325** (0.0156) -0.0869*** (0.0279)
memnum 0.0273 (0.0177) -0.00785 (0.0176) 0.0106 (0.0121) -0.00505 (0.0215)
attend -0.0181 (0.0133) 0.00549 (0.0132) -0.00939 (0.00924) 0.0816*** (0.0167)
racehome 0.0713 (0.0717) 0.0104 (0.0712) -0.0207 (0.0498) -0.260*** (0.0893)
comsize 0.0128 (0.00957) 0.00272 (0.00951) 0.00673 (0.00688) 0.0174 (0.0125)
comedu -0.000832 (0.000707) 0.0000599 (0.000702) -0.000254 (0.000514) -0.00173* (0.000929)
_cons -0.813*** (0.234) 0.0310 (0.233) 2.898*** (0.160) 4.053*** (0.288)
N 951 951 1132 1099
R2 0.072 0.100 0.062 0.080
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
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In the third column, we move closer to our theoretical model and include the variables
capturing beliefs and perceptions. These variables add much to the explanatory power
of the regression.28 They all go in the expected direction. Decreases of  (polviews
increases when individuals become less liberal) and of V ar()(i) (FactorE¤) decrease the
desired degree of redistribution. The factors related to luck (FactorDi and FactorPa)
increase the preferences for redistribution. The positive e¤ect of FactorPIn may seem
surprising at rst, but this factor is heavily inuenced by the perception that skills and
education are important in explaining income di¤erences and is therefore also related
to belabil. Following our suggestion that belabil is positively correlated with V ar(a)(i);
its signicantly positive e¤ect suggests that respondents are not meritocratic and rather
treat ability di¤erences as resulting from the natural lottery (see Table 1). One could
have expected (or hoped) that the introduction of beliefs and perceptions would decrease
the importance of demographic variables such as being black or having grandparents with
a foreign nationality: there is indeed some e¤ect, but it remains small.
Our theoretical model o¤ers scope for di¤erent ideas about the deservingness of tal-
ent (through the parameter ). We do not have a variable that measures this trait
directly, but, rather than assuming that belabil has the same e¤ect for everybody, we
can try to measure di¤erences in opinions by introducing interaction e¤ects. The results
are reported in the fourth column of Table 7. Given the small number of observations,
caution is needed when interpreting these results, but they are still suggestive. Females
are less inclined than males to increase the degree of redistribution when the importance
of talent increases. Moreover, there is a signicant interaction e¤ect with education. As
28Explanatory is meant to refer to statistical features and does not imply causality. Indeed, one
does not have to be particularly cynical to note that regressing attitudeson other attitudesis bound
to lead to strong associations.
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a matter of fact, belabil has a negative e¤ect on preferences for redistribution for highly
educated females.29 The direct e¤ect of being female now becomes signicantly positive,
but the interaction e¤ect with belabil implies that the net e¤ect becomes negative for
women who believe that V ar(a)(i) is large (belabil equal to 4). Introducing these inter-
action e¤ects removes any (signicant) di¤erences between blacks and whites but the
loss of signicance may be due to the strong increase in the estimated standard errors.
In any case, our results suggest that beliefs and perceptions are important to explain
inter-individual di¤erences in redistributive preferences. We therefore now consider Ta-
bles 8 and 9. Most of the results speak for themselves and we will only comment on
some of them. Black respondents are less conservative, and perceive luck and ability
to be more important in explaining income di¤erences and e¤ort to be less important.
Respondents with more grandparents born outside the USA are also more liberal and be-
lieve that di¤erences in talent are an important factor contributing to income di¤erences.
Females believe less in the importance of luck and more in the importance of e¤ort.30
Higher income respondents are less inclined to believe that luck is important. Having a
higher education lowers the perception of the importance of talent, but remember that
education seems to have a strong inuence on the ideological trait : All of these results
stand to reason and o¤er a rich picture of the pattern of inter-individual di¤erences in
redistributive preferences.
The results are disappointing in terms of the approach to reference group formation
as sketched in Section 3. Except for the lower-educated respondents, living in a larger
commune increases the preferences for redistribution. Possibly, inhabitants of larger
cities are confronted with more variation in economic activities, luck and success, but
29Remember from Table 4 that the range of the education variable is from 0 to 20.
30The latter result is opposite to what was found by Fisman and ONeill (2009).
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this hypothesis is not corroborated by the ndings in Tables 8 and 9. The results for other
variables intended to capture social interactions (like memnum, racehome and attend)
are equally disappointing. This is not di¢ cult to understand, given the poor quality of
these variables as proxies for our underlying theoretical concepts. To thoroughly test
our theory, direct measurement of the essential variables (as in Cruces et al., 2013) is
necessary.
6 Conclusion
We propose a theoretical model of redistributive preferences that is able to integrate
many ndings from the empirical literature. We follow the seminal paper by Alesina
and Angeletos (2005) in assuming that income di¤erences due to luck are considered
illegitimate and those due to e¤ort legitimate, but we introduce the possibility that
income di¤erences caused by ability are seen as unjust. The individuals utility function
is a linear combination of a self-interested and a social justice part. Individuals are
characterized by two stable cultural traits: the relative weight given to self-interest
versus justice arguments in their utility function and the degree of acceptance of income
di¤erences due to ability. Their desired degree of redistribution will then depend on
the importance of luck, e¤ort and ability for the explanation of income di¤erences. We
assume that individuals are not perfectly informed about these variables and that they
derive information about them from what they observe within their reference groups. We
obtain additional insights from a simple model of homophilous reference group formation
on the basis of ability indicators.
Modelling the interplay between self-interest, stable cultural traits and (imperfect)
information acquisition seems a promising approach to get a better insight into inter-
individual di¤erences in redistributive preferences. Yet it is clear that our model is only
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a rst step in that direction. The most obvious shortcoming is on the empirical side. A
real test of our model would require the estimation of a full structural model. To make
this possible, a specic survey must be set up to collect direct measures of the relevant
theoretical concepts.
From a theoretical perspective, extensions and renements are possible in at least
three directions. First, redistributive preferences have implications for instruments other
than the marginal tax rate  in a linear income tax scheme. In fact, as soon as one dis-
tinguishes di¤erent individuals on the basis of personal characteristics related to e¤ort,
talent and need, redistributive instruments such as tagging, social insurance, the pro-
vision of public goods and the public provision of private goods such as education and
health care, immediately become relevant. Second, the description of individual pref-
erences could be rened to go beyond the responsibility-sensitive egalitarian approach
that has been modelled in this paper. Libertarian and utilitarian perspectives may not
be very popular amongst the population, but they have dominated the academic litera-
ture until now. Third, and most importantly, our model of information acquisition and
learning should be rened. It would be useful to model explicitly a process of Bayesian
updating of a priori information (e.g. obtained from ones parents or importedfrom
a home country) on the basis of the actual observations in the reference group. Our sim-
ple model of network formation could be expanded. Last but not least, individuals do
not only acquire information through their social neighborhood, but they use also other
informational sources (e.g. mass media), and it is an open question how they combine
the pieces of information obtained from these di¤erent sources.
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A Mathematical appendix: proofs
A.1 Derivation of equation (10)
By denition
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Expanding this gives
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By Condition 1, this simplies to
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which can be simplied further to equation (10).
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A.2 Second order conditions
Note that
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in which private utility is strictly concave for aii < 2aii (as in Alesina and Angeletos,
2005), while
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to guarantee global strict concavity of the optimal tax problem:
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A.3 Comparative statics for sophisticated consumers
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@
= 2 (1  )V ar (")(i)   2 (1     ) (2     2) (1  )

(i)
2
V ar (a)(i)
+2 (1  )  (1  2)  a(i)2 V ar ()(i) :
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we have for self interest
@ (i = 0)
@i
=  (1  ) (1  i ) ai  0
@ (i = 0)
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=  (1  ) (1  i )i  0
For the cultural traits
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:
For the perceptions and beliefs
@ (i = 0)
@V ar (")(i)
= (2 (1  i ))  0
@ (i = 0)
@V ar ()(i)
=2i (1  i )(2i   1)
 
a(i)
2  0 for i  12
@ (i = 0)
@a(i)
= (1  ) (1  2i ) (i) + 4i (1  i )(2i   1) a(i)V ar ()(i)
@ (i = 0)
@V ar (a)(i)
=2 (1  i ) (1     i )(2  2i   )((i))2
@ (i = 0)
@(i)
= (1  ) (1  2i ) a(i) + 4 (1  i ) (1     i )(2  2i   )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A.4 Unidimensional reference group formation based on talent
If  = 1, individual i only takes into account professional talent in the formation of her
reference group, so that eq. (16) reduces to  (i) = fjj jai   aj j  g : We derive for the
perceived mean and variance of a :
a(i) =
R ai+
ai  s
a (s) ds
a (ai + )  a (ai   )
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V ar (a)(i) =
R ai+
ai 
 
z   a(i)
2
a (z) dz
a (ai + )  a (ai   ) :
These expressions immediately show that the beliefs of individual i will be inuenced
by her position in the distribution of talents. It is obvious that @a(i)=@ai > 0. The sign
of @V ar(a)(i)=@ai is less straightforward, as it depends on the shape of 
a(a). If a(a)
is the uniform density, natural talent ai has no e¤ect on the perceived variance.
An increase in  (i.e. an increase in the marginal utility of social relations  or a
decrease in the cost c) will lead to an extension of the reference group of the individual.
This results in
@a(i)
@
=
((ai + )
a (ai + ) + (ai   )a (ai   ))
a (ai + )  a (ai   )
 (
a (ai + ) + 
a (ai   )) a(i)
a (ai + )  a (ai   ) ;
which is positive i¤
a(i)   (ai   )
(ai + )  a(i)
<
a (ai + )
a (ai   ) :
Again, the e¤ect of changes in  will depend on the shape of a(a). If a(a) is uniform
and if  (i) is strictly within the support of a(a), the perceived mean a(i) obviously does
not change with changes in :
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The e¤ect on the perceived variance is
@V ar (a)(i)
@
=
0BBBBBBBB@
 2 R ai+ai   z   a(i) @a(i)@ a (z) dz
+
0B@  (ai + )  a(i)2 a (ai + )
+
 
(ai   )  a(i)
2
a (ai   )
1CA
  (a (ai + ) + a (ai   ))V ar (a)(i)
1CCCCCCCCA
a (ai + )  a (ai   )
=
 
ai +    a(i)
2   V ar (a)(i)a (ai + )
+

ai      a(i))2   V ar (a)(i)

a (ai   )
a (ai + )  a (ai   ) :
This expression is positive i¤
((ai +    a(i))2   V ar(a)(i))a(ai + )
+((ai      a(i))2   V ar (a)(i))a (ai   ) > 0
A su¢ cient condition for this is that a is not too skewed around ai, so that both
V ar (a)(i)  
 
(ai + )  a(i)
2
< 0
and
V ar (a)(i)  
 
(ai   )  a(i)
2
< 0:
This condition is denitely satised if a is uniform.
B Data appendix: Variable denitions
B.1 Dependent variables
We use following dependent variables, which were redened if necessary to ensure that
a higher value means a higher preferred level of redistribution.
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F Redist1 (original variable eqwlth): responses to the statement "Some people think
that the government in Washington ought to reduce the income di¤erences between the
rich and the poor, perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy families or by giving income
assistance to the poor. Others think that the government should not concern itself with
reducing this income di¤erence between the rich and the poor.", with responses ranging
from 0 (government should not concern itself with reducing income di¤erences) to 6 (the
government ought to reduce the income di¤erences between rich and poor).
F Redist2 (original variable eqincome): responses to the statement "It is the respon-
sibility of the government to reduce the di¤erences in income between people with high
incomes and those with low incomes.", with responses ranging from 0 (disagree strongly)
to 4 (agree strongly)
F Incdi¤ (original variable incgap): responses to the statement "Di¤erences in in-
come in America are too large.", with responses ranging from 0 (disagree strongly) to 4
(agree strongly)
F Txshrri (original variable taxshare): responses to the statement "Do you think
that people with high incomes should pay a larger share of their income in taxes than
those with low incomes, the same share, or a smaller share...", with responses ranging
from 0 (much lower share) to 4 (much higher share)
B.2 Beliefs and perceptions
First, following variables characterize respondents beliefs about the determinants of
success in life. The opening statement reads: To begin, we have some questions about
opportunities for getting ahead... Please show for each of these how important you think
it is for getting ahead in life...These variables were redened such that responses range
from 0 (not important at all) to 4 (essential).
51
F Belwealf (original variable opwlth): "Coming from a wealthy family?"
F Beledupa (original variable oppared): "Having well educated parents?"
F Beledu (original variable opeduc): "Having a good education yourself?"
F Belambit (original variable opambit): "Ambition? how important is that?"
F Belabil (original variable opable): "Natural ability? how important is that?"
F Belwork (original variable ophrdwrk): "Hard work how important is that for
getting ahead in life?"
F Belcnnct (original variable opknow): "Knowing the right people?"
F Belpolcn (original variable opclout): "Having political connections?"
F Belrace (original variable oprace): "A persons race how important is that?"
F Belrelig (original variable oprelig ): "A persons religion?"
F Belregio (original variable opregion): "A persons region?"
F Belsex (original variable opsex): "Being born a man or a woman how important
is that for getting ahead in life?"
F Belpolvi (original variable oppol): "A persons political beliefs?"
Second, the following variables capture respondentsperception of the incentive ef-
fects of income inequality.
F Incmoti (original variable incentiv) states "Some people earn a lot of money while
others do not earn very much at all. In order to get people to work hard, do you think
large di¤erences in pay are..., with responses ranging from 0 (denitely not necessary)
to 3 (absolutely necessary)
F Incresp (original variable inequal1) states People would not want to take extra
responsibility at work unless they were paid extra for it", with responses ranging from
0 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree)
F Incskil (original variable inequal2) states "Workers would not bother to get skills
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and qualications unless they were paid extra for having them, with responses ranging
from 0 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree)
F Incedu (original variable inequal4) states "No one would study for years to become
a lawyer or doctor unless they expected to earn a lot more than ordinary workers., with
responses ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree)
F Incprosp (original variable inequal5) states Large di¤erences in income are nec-
essary for Americas prosperity, with responses ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 4
(strongly agree)
F Incbuspr (original variable inequal6) states Allowing business to make good prof-
its is the best way to improve everyones standard of living., with responses ranging
from 0 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree)
Third, we include respondentsgeneral political attitude, as in Alesina and Giuliano
(2011).
F Polviews: collects responses to the statement " We hear a lot of talk these days
about liberals and conservatives. Im going to show you a seven-point scale on which
the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal point 1
to extremely conservative point 7. Where would you place yourself on this scale?"
B.3 Control variables
We use the following baseline control variables in all regressions:
F Rlincome (original variable realinc): household income in 1986 dollars.
F Prospect (original variable goodlife): expectations for the future standard of living,
reponses to the statement "The way things are in America, people like me and my family
have a good chance of improving our standard of living.", with responses ranging from
0 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree).
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F Educ: years of education, responses to the statement "What is the highest grade
in elementary school or high school that you nished and got credit for?"
F Age and agesq : respondentsage, and the square of age.
F Female (original variable sex): dummy variable, 1 if the respondent is female.
F Black and raceoth (original variable race): dummy variables, resp. 1 if respondent
is black and if respondent is non-white and non-black.
F Granborn: number of the respondents grandparents born outside the U.S.
F Comsize (original variable size): the size of the respondents commune or city,
expressed in 100 000s of inhabitants.
F Attend : church attendance, answers to the question "How often do you attend
religious services?", ranging from 0 (never) to 7 (every week).
F Racehome: dummy variable which is 1 if respondents answered yesto the ques-
tion "During the last few years, has anyone in your family brought a friend who was a
(negro/black/African-American) home for dinner?"
F Memnum: number of organisations that respondent is member of
F Occmobi (original variable occmobil): di¤erence in professional status from father,
answers to the question "Please think of your present job (or your last one if you dont
have one now). If you compare this job with the job your father had when you were 16,
would you say that the level or status of your job is (or was)..." with responses either 0
(about equal), 1 ("higher" or "lower") or 2 ("much higher" and "much lower").
C Additional regressions
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Table 10: Explaining preferences for redistribution as Redist1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
redist1 redist1 redist1 redist1
rlincome -0.00910*** (0.00251) -0.00941*** (0.00260) -0.00847*** (0.00270) -0.00843*** (0.00270)
prospect -0.251*** (0.0580) -0.270*** (0.0615) -0.145** (0.0673) -0.153** (0.0674)
educ -0.0386** (0.0195) -0.0509** (0.0223) -0.0578** (0.0261) -0.0495 (0.0811)
female 0.128 (0.106) 0.203* (0.113) 0.288** (0.122) 0.811* (0.436)
black 0.615*** (0.125) 0.621*** (0.149) 0.550*** (0.169) -0.414 (0.561)
raceoth 0.442 (0.306) 0.277 (0.338) -0.561 (0.408) -0.574 (0.408)
age -0.00219 (0.00334) -0.00319 (0.00373) -0.00246 (0.00410) -0.00238 (0.00409)
occmobi 0.0250 (0.0739) 0.0610 (0.0812) 0.0582 (0.0812)
granborn 0.0949** (0.0386) 0.0671 (0.0421) 0.0707* (0.0421)
memnum 0.0222 (0.0302) 0.00318 (0.0325) 0.00284 (0.0325)
attend -0.0193 (0.0230) -0.00201 (0.0252) -0.00170 (0.0252)
racehome -0.0923 (0.124) -0.113 (0.133) -0.124 (0.133)
comsize -0.0297* (0.0172) -0.0374** (0.0177) -0.0376** (0.0178)
comedu 0.00270** (0.00129) 0.00300** (0.00130) 0.00298** (0.00131)
FactorDi 0.113* (0.0629) 0.105* (0.0630)
FactorPa 0.114* (0.0620) 0.105* (0.0622)
FactorPIn 0.120** (0.0602) 0.117* (0.0602)
FactorE¤ -0.114* (0.0619) -0.119* (0.0620)
FactorGIn -0.209*** (0.0617) -0.211*** (0.0617)
belabil 0.177** (0.0848) 0.247 (0.397)
polviews -0.210*** (0.0455) -0.211*** (0.0455)
abil_edu -0.00247 (0.0282)
abil_fem -0.199 (0.157)
abil_bla 0.350* (0.192)
_cons 4.625*** (0.365) 4.771*** (0.398) 4.770*** (0.551) 4.581*** (1.191)
N 1281 1144 915 915
R2 0.075 0.083 0.156 0.160
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01 55
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